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The notion of studying internal control variables instead of externally observable parameters is certainly attractive. It is what motivates neurophysiologists to stick their electrodes into various parts of the nervous system. The problem is knowing a control variable when you see one. Recorded neural activity reflects a mixture of outputs representing some kind of control to various lower centers plus inputs representing both the neurons' own control from higher centers as well as sensory feedback and efference copy from lower centers. So inevitably we guess at what might be a control variable at any particular level, look for correlations and hope for causality. If we guess that an observable parameter is actually the controlled variable (e.g. end-point trajectory in extra-personal coordinates), then the exercise is straightforward, albeit perhaps pointless as discussed below. If the hypothesized controlled variable must be computed from various parameters of the task, then it seems essential to justify the choice and to suggest how it might be computed by the nervous system.
The equilibrium point (EP) hypothesis suggests that there are two control variables, CV1 related to the balance between antagonistic muscles controlling an equilibrium posture, and CV2 related to cocontraction of antagonistic muscles thereby modulating the impedance (stiffness) of the posture. While this idea obviously resonates with early research on control of single-joint movements and reciprocally organized stretch reflexes in antagonist muscles, it is remarkable how vague it becomes when extended to more realistic, multiarticular movements and musculature (see list below). This presumably relates to the "lack of tools to study patterns of control variables", a shortcoming that the proponents of the EP hypothesis must resolve if their hypothesis is to be testable.
• If there is a pair of CVs for each joint, then how do you apportion the control of multiarticular muscles crossing more than one joint? Consider a task that requires stabilizing CVs at one set of joints (e.g. grip aperture) but most of the relevant muscles cross another joint (e.g. wrist) that may be moving according to other task requirements (e.g. hand orientation). How does the CNS shift the λs for all the muscles to compensate for the length changes arising from the wrist motion? • If a joint has more than one degree of freedom (e.g. wrist, shoulder), then how do you apportion the control of muscles whose pulling vectors are intermediate between the canonical coordinates of the experiment and may even be changing with posture?
• If two muscles have the same mechanical actions at a joint but differ in their internal architecture (e.g. pinnation) or fiber-type composition, then does the principle of minimal final action provide any guidance on how best to recruit them? Subjects can control such muscles selectively to take advantage of aspects of musculoskeletal architecture (Cheng & Loeb, 2008 ) that seem to be outside the scope of the EP hypothesis as presently formulated.
• Does "motor noise" enter into these allocations of recruitment? This is has been a fertile, perhaps even over-worked, source of insights into emergent behavior (e.g. Todorov, 2005) . Proponents of the EP hypothesis have been strangely silent on this.
• If the goals of a task require CVs related to a parameter such as "grip aperture" that must be computed from multiple sources of proprioceptive input instead of inherent in a single source such as the spindle afferents from a given muscle (Scott & Loeb, 1994) , then how and where is that computation performed? Cole & Abbs (1987) demonstrated rapid, presumably spinal reflexes that maintained finger-thumb apposition. An imposed extension perturbation to the thumb was compensated by an extension motion in the apposed index finger rather than either a homonymous stretch reflex in the thumb (which would have been ineffectual) or a "synergist" stretch reflex in the index fingers (which would have been counter-productive).
• If a task requires control of forces exerted on an object, then how does the widely distributed and short-latency sensory feedback from tactile sensors (Johansson & Flanagan, 2007) and Golgi tendon organs relate to a hypothesis that seems to be fixated on muscle spindle afferents? The spinal interneuronal circuitry is much richer than just a generator of stretch reflexes (PierrotDeseilligny & Burke, 2005) . Given the lack of detail on exactly how one can infer the trajectory of these control variables from the requirements of a particular task, it is perhaps not surprising that there have been no attempts to correlate neural activity recorded at any level of the central nervous system with the presumed CVs that at least some of these neurons should be controlling. This would be an even more striking omission were it not for the fact that experimentalists studying correlations between such neural activity and directly observable parameters (e.g. end-point position and velocity, net joint torques, EMG, etc.) are finally becoming frustrated with the futility of that exercise (e.g. Churchland & Shenoy, 2007) . For reasons that we clearly do not understand, the neural activity patterns that have been recorded from various levels of the sensorimotor nervous system (e.g. motor and premotor cortex, association cortex, somatosensory cortex, spinal interneurons) are so diverse as to be essentially indistinguishable, despite the obvious differences in clinical pathology produced by lesions in these various areas. Furthermore, even if the command signal at a given level were relatively simple, that information would be inextricably convolved with the dense feedback from the lower centers onto the same neurons, long known (Lee & Tatton, 1975; Evarts & Tanji, 1976) and now mostly ignored.
The fact that experimental observations in normal and pathological subjects can be interpreted according to the EP control variables adds nothing to the argument about whether these CVs represent an actual coordinate frame within the CNS. It is a mathematical truism that any data set can be represented in any coordinate frame if the frame has sufficient dimensionality. As soon as the proponents of EP control acknowledged that the EP trajectory could be "virtual" rather than reflective of the actual posture at each point in a task, that dimensionality was guaranteed. Of course, neurophysiologists and clinicians freely adopt suppositions about internal computations if they seem useful to explain particular forms of disability that arise from damage to the presumed loci of those computations. Thus, it is particularly telling that the "handful of studies" in damaged systems seem to be all over the map, with no indication that the separation of control into CV1 and CV2 provides any useful summaries of or insights into clinical pathology. This "gold rush" remains in the eye of the beholder.
Thus the EP hypothesis, despite much theoretical development, remains more of a conjecture than a testable hypothesis. Unfortunately, not much more can be said for the competition. Sensorimotor control continues to lack a compelling theory of computation. In such a structureless environment, it is difficult to formulate testable hypotheses about the function of individual subsystems. At least the EP hypothesis reminds us that in a hierarchical system, the output coordinate frame of a controller (e.g. motor cortex) must reflect the natural computational function of the subsystem being controlled (e.g. spinal cord) rather than the canonical coordinate frames whereby experimenters define the tasks being performed (Loeb et al., 1999) .
Many of the candidate theories and hypotheses start with the original problem of motor redundancy as posed by Bernstein in the 1930s, the "father" of the EP school of theoreticians. "At each level of the hierarchy, the input is lowdimensional as compared to the output," in the words of Latash. This is true only if one assumes that the input is a simple, high-level specification of the goal of the task as posed by the experimenter (Loeb, 2000) . But we do not know how the goals of the task are actually represented in the CNS. The evidence from cortical single unit recordings suggests that these representations are actually rather high dimensional. Certainly the number of descending axons in the corticospinal tract far exceeds the number of muscles to be controlled. What are all these communication channels signaling?
The interpretation of the task by the brain presumably includes a vast amount of personal experience about aspects of the task that were not explicitly controlled, specified or even known by the experimenter: computational noise in both sensory and motor systems, expectation of external perturbations, susceptibility to fatigue, personal value of the reward, consequences of failure, etc. These aspects have implications for the details of task performance that the experimenter thinks are "redundant" (e.g. starting posture, kinematic trajectory, distribution of effort among partially synergistic muscles, gains of individual reflexes, etc.). If such considerations have already been incorporated into the command signal at a given level of the hierarchy, then the dimensionality at that level may actually be much higher than the dimensionality of the lower level under its control. Thus, the premise of redundancy that motivates the EP and many other current conjectures about centralized motor planning and control may reflect a fundamental misconception about how the brain works.
